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MAKING STATE CIVIL PROCEDURE
Zachary D. Clopton†
State courts matter.  Not only do state courts handle more
than sixty times the number of civil cases as federal courts,
but they also represent an important bulwark against the ef-
fects of federal procedural retrenchment.  Yet state courts and
state procedure are notably absent from the scholarly
discourse.
In order to evaluate state procedure—and in order to un-
derstand the states’ relationship to federal procedural re-
trenchment—this Article presents the first comprehensive
study of who makes state civil procedure.  This project begins
with a systematic review of the formal processes by which
states make their rules of procedure.  Many of the relevant
sources were not publicly accessible, so this project not only
collects important data but in so doing also makes state proce-
dure more accessible.
Formal rulemaking authority is only part of the story.  At
the federal level, scholars have focused on the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules: an elite committee of mostly judges and
practitioners, selected by the Chief Justice, that plays a pri-
mary role in proposing amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.  Critics have argued that the advisory commit-
tee favors corporate interests, and they have attributed these
effects to committee membership.  Since the 1960s, there has
been a dramatic decline in the share of practitioners on the
committee and, simultaneously, an increased homogeneity
among its members—i.e., Republican judges and corporate
defense attorneys.
State advisory committees have gone virtually unstudied.
Indeed, in many states, advisory committee membership is
not readily accessible.  I collected membership information for
every state advisory committee, and this Article compares
these little-studied state committees to the well-known federal
committee.  In brief, state committees are notably more di-
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verse.  They have far greater representation of practitioners
than the federal committee, and those practitioners are more
evenly divided between plaintiff- and defense-side lawyers
and between individual and corporate lawyers.  Partisan ef-
fects are less severe among state judge members than at the
federal level.  State committees have much greater female rep-
resentation than the federal advisory committee, and at least
equal representation of racial and ethnic minorities.  But at the
same time, many state committees are less accessible to the
public than the federal committee is.
This Article then makes at least three contributions.  First,
although these data do not support causal inference, they
permit normative engagement with the design of rulemaking
institutions.  This analysis connects with interdisciplinary re-
search on decision-making that suggests that epistemic diver-
sity can produce better and more durable outputs.  Second, I
argue that civil rulemaking can unite accessibility and diver-
sity.  States can be more accessible, and federal rulemaking
can be more diverse.  Finally, as state procedure becomes
more important, this Article helps ensure that relevant infor-
mation is not limited to those with privileged access and the
resources to use it.
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In the 1980s, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were in
crisis.1  Critics zeroed in on the Advisory Committee on Rules of
1 See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 103–12 (2017) (describing this
period and collecting sources).
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Civil Procedure, an elite group of judges and lawyers appointed
by the Chief Justice, that has primary responsibility for
drafting amendments to the Federal Rules.2  Critics charged
that this unelected committee pursued narrow corporate
interests without meaningful process.3  In response, Congress
debated amendments to the Rules Enabling Act that would
increase the transparency of the Advisory Committee and
would require that committee membership reflect a balanced
cross section of the bench and bar.  The final legislation
required transparency, but at the last minute, the “balanced
cross section” language was dropped with little explanation.4
Today, concerns about the Federal Rules and the federal
advisory committee are on the rise again.  The 2015 discovery
amendments,5 and the famous (or infamous) “Duke
Conference” that launched them,6 have been criticized as too
focused on the interests of large corporate defendants.7
Defenders of the rulemaking process point to its transparency.8
But what good are open meetings and public comments, the
critics say, if the same conservative judges and corporate
lawyers make the final decisions?
Unnoticed by virtually all procedure scholars, the states
are pursuing a different course.  State advisory committees are
more diverse, though sometimes less accessible, than the
federal advisory committee.
Indeed, the lack of accessibility is part of the reason that
state procedure-making has been understudied.9  But state
2 I use “federal advisory committee” to refer to this body throughout this
Article.
3 BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 65–67; see 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2018)
(authorizing federal advisory committees).
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2018) (as amended); 134 CONG. REC. 31,067 (daily
ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (Senate); 134 CONG. REC. 31,861–74 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988)
(House); see also infra note 254. R
5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
6 REPORT FROM THE TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND CIVIL JUSTICE OF THE AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM TO THE 2010 CIVIL LITIGATION CONFERENCE (2010), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/actl_task_force_iaals_report_to_the_2010_
civil_litigation_conference.pdf [https://perma.cc/FUM4-HRNG].
7 See Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005,
1022–23 (2016); see also infra notes 89 & 214 (collecting sources). R
8 See infra notes 246–49 and accompanying text. R
9 This is not the only reason, of course. See, e.g., Brian J. Ostrom, et al.,
Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 755,
756–57 (2004) (“The perennial difficulty in compiling accurate and comparable
data at the state level can in large measure be pinned on the fact that there are 50
states with at least 50 different ways of doing business and 50 different levels of
commitment to data compilation.”).
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courts matter.  Not only do state courts handle more than sixty
times the number of civil cases as federal courts,10 but they
also represent an important bulwark against the effects of
federal procedural retrenchment on substantive rights.  As
decisions such as Twombly, Iqbal, and Wal-Mart v. Dukes make
federal courts less amenable to certain claims and claimants,11
those interested in the vigorous enforcement of important
rights can (and should) look to state courts for redress.12
Regardless of one’s views on the merits of these procedural
decisions, they may have the effect of pushing more (and more
important) cases into state courts.
If state procedure becomes a more significant vehicle for
vindicating important rights, it will likely become a more
important site for political contestation as well.13  In fact, state
civil procedure is starting to get some attention.  In Arkansas, a
“tort reform”-inspired constitutional amendment is on the
ballot in 2018 that would increase the legislature’s role in
judicial rulemaking.14  The Conference of Chief Justices has
issued a major “Call to Action” on state procedure.15  And the
American College of Trial Lawyers—a group that played an
important role in the aforementioned Duke Conference—has
taken up the cause of state civil procedure reform.16  All sides,
it seems, should be paying more attention to the states.
10 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE: THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL
LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 6 n.36 (2015), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/
PDF/Research/CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashxashx [https://perma.cc/2JRV-
C3EM].
11 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 687 (2009); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 366–67
(2011).
12 See infra Parts I & III.  States also can be breeding grounds for procedural
reform.  For example, the federal courts are currently engaged in a pilot project on
automatic discovery based on an innovation in Arizona state civil procedure. See
ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1.
13 See also Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 411, 467–70 (2018) (collecting sources).  Another possible effect is
that, if interest groups do not get their way in the states, they might push for
expanding federal jurisdiction instead.
14 See S.J.R. 8, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.  (Ark. 2017).
15 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: ACHIEVING CIVIL JUSTICE FOR
ALL: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES BY THE CIVIL JUSTICE
IMPROVEMENTS COMMITTEE (2016), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/microsites/
files/civil-justice/ncsc-cji-report-web.ashx [https://perma.cc/5CET-U2DG].
16 See generally Judiciary Committee, AM. C. TRIAL LAW., https://
www.actl.com/home/committees/general-committees/judiciary-committee
(noting committee membership and mandate) [https://perma.cc/N9NN-U3HV].
For examples of recent academic interest, see generally Symposium, The Least
Understood Branch: The Demands and Challenges of the State Judiciary, 70 VAND.
L. REV. 1701 (2017); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Seeking Proportional Discovery:
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In order to evaluate state procedure—and in order to
understand the states’ relationship to federal procedural
retrenchment—this Article presents the first systematic study
of who makes state civil procedure.  This project first surveys
the mechanisms by which every state makes rules of civil
procedure.  The results are described herein and documented
in detail in the comprehensive appendix, including identifying
documents not previously accessible to the public.17  These
results, therefore, are not only of scholarly interest but also can
help make state procedure more accessible by collecting these
details all in one place.
To illustrate the states’ varied processes, this project also
documents the role of state rulemaking on two issues that have
dominated procedural scholarship in recent years: pleading
and class actions.  This Article includes the first systematic
study of the process by which states made their law on these
topics (and more).18  These surveys demonstrate the variation
in state procedure-making and the continued importance of
court-based rulemaking in particular.  They also suggest that
state rulemakers do more than simply mirror the federal
rules.19
Then, inspired by pathbreaking work on federal
rulemaking,20 this project examines the actors involved in state
rulemaking.  Although proceduralists are well aware of the
importance of the federal advisory committee, state advisory
committees have gone virtually unstudied.21  In light of the
federal experience, I collected membership information for
every state civil advisory committee.  I then compared
The Beginning of the End of Procedural Uniformity in Civil Rules, 71 VAND. L. REV.
1919 (2018); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State
Courts Should Not Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501 (2016).
17 See infra subpart I.A & Part II and Appendices (collecting information and
sources on the formal rulemaking processes and the role of advisory committees
(if any)). The appendices are maintained online by the Cornell Law Review at
http://www.cornelllawreview.org.
18 See infra subparts I.B–D and Appendix Tables C–E (discussing pleading,
class actions, discovery, forms, offers of judgment, work product, and sanctions).
19 This work connects with prior studies of state procedure, see infra note 44, R
though my focus on procedure-making institutions varies from those earlier
treatments.
20 This project owes an enormous tangible and conceptual debt to the work of
Stephen Burbank, described in detail infra notes 108–13 and accompanying text. R
21 For a notable exception, studying the advisory-committee process in
western states, see Thomas Main, Civil Rulemaking in Nevada: Contemplating a
New Advisory Committee, 14 NEV. L.J. 852, 853–62 (2014).
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empirically these little-studied state committees to the well-
studied federal committee.
In short, federal and state advisory committees vary
substantially.  Critics of the federal advisory committee have
noted a dramatic decline in the share of practitioners and,
simultaneously, an increased homogeneity in committee
membership—i.e., defense-side corporate attorneys and judges
appointed by Republican presidents.22  State committees have
far greater representation of practitioners than the federal
committee.  Those state practitioners are more evenly divided
between plaintiff- and defense-side lawyers and between
individual and corporate lawyers.  Partisan effects exist among
state judge members, though they are seemingly less severe
than at the federal level.  (State committees also have much
greater female representation than the federal committee, and
at least equal representation of racial and ethnical minorities.)
Consider, for example, the composition of today’s state
committees and the federal committee since 2000.23
STATE AND FEDERAL COMMITTEES
State Committees (2017)






























22 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 19; see also infra note 119 and R
accompanying text.
23 The sources and methods for compiling these tables are provided infra Part
II.
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This Article then makes at least three contributions.  First,
this Article contextualizes its empirical findings in light of re-
cent research on diversity and group decision making.  Episte-
mic diversity among state rulemakers may have consequences
for the content of civil procedure.  This is especially important
in an era of federal procedural retrenchment: state courts are
becoming even more important vehicles for protecting substan-
tive rights, so if we did not care about state procedure-making
before, we must now.
Second, as state procedure becomes more important, this
Article helps ensure that relevant information is not limited to
those with resources and privileged access.  Collecting state-
level information took a considerable investment in time, and I
was substantially aided by a network of contacts to rely upon,
the experience to know where to look, and a willingness to be a
squeaky wheel.  By sharing this information, this Article di-
rectly contributes to the state procedure-making accessibility
that I find lacking—and hopefully helps to level the playing field
among those interested in civil procedure and access to justice.
Third and finally, this Article calls for federal and state
rulemakers to learn from one another.  Diversity and accessi-
bility are not mutually exclusive.  State rulemaking can be
more accessible, and federal rulemaking can be more diverse.
This Article shows how.24
*  *  *
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I, in
conjunction with the Appendix, describes the rulemaking pro-
cess in all fifty states.  This includes a description of formal
rulemaking authorities and a series of studies on rulemaking
in action, the latter focusing on the law of pleading and class
actions.  Having identified judicial rulemaking as a central
24 This paper does not advocate for court-based rulemaking, but assumes it
is here to stay. Compare Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court
Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887,
890 (1999) [hereinafter Bone, Process of Making Process] (defending “a view of
court rulemaking that sees its central function as developing and maintaining a
system of rules that reflects the best principled account of procedural practice”),
and Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103–15 (2002) (identifying positive
features of judicial procedure-making), with Martin H. Redish & Uma M.
Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the
Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303,
1305–08 (2006) (articulating accountability critique of judicial rulemaking).  Note,
too, that state rulemaking may not be susceptible to the same constitutional
critique as federal rulemaking.  Redish & Amuluru, at 1319–27.
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form of procedure-making, I then turn to the state advisory
committees.  Part II documents their creation, selection, and
membership.  Part III evaluates these results and offers norma-
tive conclusions about the making of civil procedure at the
state and federal levels.  Although there will always be disa-
greement about the content of procedural rules, perhaps there
is some common ground on the way we should go about mak-
ing those rules in the first place.
I
MAKING STATE PROCEDURE
As most lawyers and law students are aware, the Rules
Enabling Act authorizes the Supreme Court of the United
States to make the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.25  Impor-
tant changes to federal procedure also may result from legisla-
tion26 or from common-law adjudication in the federal courts.27
This Part describes the process of making state rules of
civil procedure beginning with a survey of the formal proce-
dure-making authorities in all fifty states.28  It then describes
the ways that states have made procedural law on important
issues such as pleading, class actions, and more.29  While
25 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2018) (Rules Enabling Act); see generally
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1018–27 (1982) [hereinafter Burbank, Rules Enabling Act]; Leslie M. Kelleher,
Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 47, 49 (1998); Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Judicial Independence
Symposium: Judicial Power and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 MERCER L. REV. 733,
735 (1995); Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the
Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 26, 26–27 (2008); A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules
Enabling Act, 66 U.C.L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
26 See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2018).
27 E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 366–67 (2011); Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007); see also BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 21 (“In marked contrast R
to its substantial failure in Congress and modest success in the domain of
rulemaking, the counterrevolution against private enforcement of federal rights
achieved growing rates of support, especially over the past several decades, from
an increasingly conservative Supreme Court.”).
28 See infra subpart I.A.  This part of my project connects with (and updates)
important prior studies on state procedure-making. See John B. Oakley & Arthur
F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of
Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1424–26 (1986); Charles Alan Wright,
Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85, 85–88 (1959); see also infra note 44 R
(discussing studies of federal and state procedure).
29 See infra subparts I.B–D (discussing pleading, class actions, “proportional-
ity,” offers of judgment, work-product doctrine, and sanctions).  For more exam-
ples of state-law procedural variation, see the magisterial appendices to BENJAMIN
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much ink has been spilled on the federal versions of these
questions, and scholars occasionally dip into the states, there
has not been a concerted effort to examine the mechanisms by
which states have made procedure in these areas.30
A. State Procedure-Making Authority
There are two broad types of state procedure-making ar-
rangements: “rules states” primarily rely on court-made rules
and “code states” primarily rely on legislatures.
Forty-one states have followed some version of the federal
model of court-based rulemaking.31  More specifically, of the
forty-one rules states, all but three empower the highest court
to make the rules of civil procedure,32 occasionally with legisla-
tive involvement.33  In Delaware and Rhode Island, lower
courts take the lead on procedural drafting, subject to the au-
thority of the state high court.34  In Oregon, a Council on Court
Procedures—made up primarily of judges and lawyers—has
the power to make rules of civil procedure directly, subject to
V. MADISON, CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR ALL STATES: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK
(2010).
30 I cite these scholarly treatments throughout this Part.  Note that my study
of state procedure-making emphasizes the process of making state procedure, not
just its content, though I discuss that topic too. Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, The
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1439, 1500–09 (2008) [hereinafter Burbank, Class Action Fairness Act]
(focusing on content as opposed to process); Clopton, supra note 13, at 445–53 R
(same); Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
703, 711–17 (2016) (same); Subrin & Main, supra note 16, at 501–06 (same). R
31 See infra Appendix Table A.
32 The rules states are: Alabama; Alaska; Arizona; Arkansas; Colorado; Flor-
ida; Hawaii; Idaho; Indiana; Iowa; Kentucky; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts;
Michigan; Minnesota; Mississippi; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; Nevada; New
Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Dakota; Ohio; Oregon; Pennsylvania;
South Carolina; South Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Vermont; Virginia; Wash-
ington; West Virginia; Wisconsin; and Wyoming. See infra Appendix Table A.
33 For example, under Tennessee law, the Supreme Court has the power to
make rules of civil procedure, but such rules only become effective with approval
of the legislature. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-401 to -408 (2018).  In Montana, the
legislature may “disapprove” court-adopted rules. MONT. CONST. art. 7, § 2(3).  In
Iowa, the Supreme Court must submit proposed rules “to the legislative council
and shall at the same time report the rule or form to the chairpersons and ranking
members of the senate and house committees on judiciary.” IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 602.4202 (West 2018).  The proposed rule or amendment takes effect sixty days
after submission to the legislative council, unless the council delays the rule. Id.
The council may delay the rule to give the General Assembly time to supersede the
proposed rule with legislation. Id.
34 In Delaware, the Superior Court promulgates its own rules of civil proce-
dure, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 561 (2018), subject to the supervisory authority of
the Delaware Supreme Court. DEL. CONST. art. 4, § 13.  In Rhode Island, the
Superior Court makes rules of civil procedure, subject to approval of the Supreme
Court. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-6-2(a) (2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 10 10-JAN-19 11:51
10 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1
legislative change.35  Distinct from Oregon’s rulemaking coun-
cil, an additional thirty-five rules states employ a standing “ad-
visory committee” made up of judges, lawyers, academics, and
government officials to advise the court rulemakers.36  These
state committees are the subjects of Part II.
Meanwhile, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kan-
sas, Louisiana, New York, North Carolina, and Oklahoma are
“code states.”37  In these nine states, the rules of procedure—
and any rule amendments—are primarily promulgated
through the usual legislative process.38
In addition to rulemaking, state legislatures and state
courts may affect procedure through other means.  In all but a
few states,39 the legislature could address procedural ques-
tions through the normal lawmaking process.40  Procedural
change also might result from judicial decisions.  These deci-
sions may reflect a court’s discretion to manage litigation, or
they might be acts of statutory or rule interpretation that are
35 OR. REV. STAT. § 1.735 (2018).  A statute specifies the members of the
Council: “(a) One judge of the Supreme Court, chosen by the Supreme Court. (b)
One judge of the Court of Appeals, chosen by the Court of Appeals. (c) Eight
judges of the circuit court, chosen by the Executive Committee of the Circuit
Judges Association. (d) Twelve members of the Oregon State Bar, appointed by the
Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar. . . . (e) One public member, chosen by
the Supreme Court.” OR. REV. STAT. § 1.730 (2018).  I classify Oregon as a “rules
state” because its process better approximates court-based rulemaking and be-
cause its Council includes ten judges and no legislators.
36 See infra Part II; see also infra Appendix Tables A & B.  New Hampshire
also formally requires lay participation. See infra Appendix Tables A & B.
37 See, e.g., Oakley & Coon, supra note 28, at 1383, 1385, 1392, 1394, 1397, R
1399, 1411–13 (describing each state’s procedure-making).  This use of “code
states” is distinct from whether the state relies on “code pleading,” an unfortunate
overlap in terminology. See id.
38 Statutory procedure also plays an important role, alongside court-promul-
gated rules, in at least Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Virginia. See infra Appen-
dix Table A.  Meanwhile, in some code states, there are court rules that govern
some aspects of procedure. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. art. II.
39 In Alaska, Florida, South Carolina, and Utah, the legislature can alter
procedural rules by legislation, but it must satisfy a higher threshold than normal
legislation. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15; FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 2; S.C. Code § 14-3-
950; Utah C. Ann. § 78A-3-103. See also Ark. Joint Sen. Res. 8 (2017) (proposing
constitutional amendment to allow the legislature by three-fifths vote to amend or
repeal rules of procedure).
40 Despite this authority, state legislatures (at least outside of code states) do
not seem to routinely focus on civil procedure.  For example, on May 15, 2018, I
queried the LexisAdvance and Westlaw legislation and legislative history
databases for state legislative sources referring to Twombly or Iqbal.  I returned
zero relevant results.  That said, I have noted elsewhere examples of state legisla-
tors responding to the Supreme Court’s recent personal-jurisdiction jurispru-
dence. See Clopton, supra note 13, at 442 (discussing proposals in New York). R
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functionally equivalent to rulemaking.41  In the federal system,
many of the most well-known procedural changes in recent
years have been the result of adjudication, not rulemaking.42
In the states, too, procedural decisions have been important.43
B. Making the Law of Pleading
The previous section demonstrated that states have formal
authority to make procedure by legislation, court rule, and
judicial decision.  The next few sections demonstrate that this
division of labor exists in practice too.44
I begin with pleading.  Although I worry that an overem-
phasis on pleading has distracted recent procedure scholar-
ship, it is just too perfect a fit for the goals of this Article.  I will
not, though, wade into overcrowded debates about the effect of
different pleading standards or their normative conse-
quences.45  Instead, I will use the law of pleading to illustrate
how procedure is made.46
Briefly, during most of the 20th century there were two
dominant modes of pleading.  Initially, “fact pleading” was par-
41 For well-known examples of each, see AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011) (interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (interpreting Rule 8); Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (articulating the discretionary doctrine of forum
non conveniens).
42 See, e.g., infra subpart I.B (discussing pleading).
43 See infra subpart I.B–D and Appendix Tables C–E; see also Clopton, supra
note 13, at 442–45 (collecting examples of state courts accepting or rejecting R
federal decisions on pleading, class actions, summary judgment, and others).
44 My analysis connects with a long line of studies focused on the relationship
between federal and state procedure.  In a series of studies beginning with Profes-
sor Charles Alan Wright in 1960, see Wright, supra note 28, at 85–88, and build- R
ing on earlier observations of Judge Charles E. Clark and others, see id., scholars
have examined the effect of the Federal Rules on the content of state rules of civil
procedure. E.g., Main, supra note 21, at 852–54; John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at R
the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 355–59 (2003); Oakley & Coon,
supra note 28, at 1367–69; Subrin & Main, supra note 16, at 501–06; see also R
Clopton, supra note 13, at 442–45 (addressing the related question of the influ- R
ence of federal procedure on state procedural jurisprudence); Dodson, supra note
30, at 707 (same). R
45 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical
Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1230–34 (2013) (collecting empiri-
cal sources); Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and
Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV. 369, 376 (2016) (same); Clopton, supra note 13, at 416–17 R
(collecting sources critical of Twombly and Iqbal).
46 Professor Wright and later Professors Oakley and Coon were at the fore-
front of studying the fact-notice distinction in state courts—and I am incredibly
indebted to their herculean efforts. See supra note 28.  Neither study, though, R
focused on exactly the question asked here: How did states switch from fact to
notice pleading (and later to plausibility pleading)?
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amount.47  Fact pleading requires pleaders to state the ulti-
mate facts upon which relief can be granted.48  Fact pleading’s
chief rival was “notice pleading.”  In order to survive a motion to
dismiss in a notice-pleading jurisdiction, a complaint must
provide no more than “ ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plain-
tiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”49
By the end of the 20th century, notice pleading dominated
U.S. civil procedure.  In federal court, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure catalyzed the rise of notice pleading,50 later exempli-
fied in cases such as Conley v. Gibson and Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema.51  In the states—perhaps owing a debt to the gravita-
tional pull of the Federal Rules52—notice pleading also took
hold, though some states stayed loyal to fact pleading.53
I reviewed the process by which each state adopted notice
pleading.54  As in the federal system, the most common route
was that a state would adopt notice pleading as part of its
introduction of court-made rules of procedure.  With some vari-
ation, this reasonably describes the process in thirty states.55
47 Any subtle distinctions between “fact pleading” and “code pleading” are not
relevant to this inquiry.
48 See, e.g., Sierocinski v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 103 F.2d 843, 844
(3d Cir. 1939) (holding that averment of certain claims was sufficient for plead-
ings); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths about Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1355–57 (2010) (distinguishing fact pleading from the “plau-
sibility pleading” described below); Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the
Federal Rules: Exploring the Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV.
845, 860–63 (2012) (same).
49 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (internal footnote omitted) (quot-
ing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
50 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
51 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
512–13 (2002).
52 See generally Dodson, supra note 30. R
53 See, e.g., Oakley & Coon, supra note 28, at 1378 (describing states that R
retained some version of fact pleading); Wright, supra note 28, at 85–88 (discuss- R
ing the effect of the Federal Rules on state procedure).  At least eleven states
require fact pleading today: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See
infra Appendix Table C.
54 Note that this analysis focuses on the courts’ formal approach to pleading,
not necessarily how every court decides cases in practice.
55 Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.  I have summarized and cited these changes in Appendix Table C.
Note, however, that the move to a rule-based system did not necessarily
involve an immediate switch to notice pleading.  In Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Mary-
land, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and South Carolina, the initial set of
court-promulgated rules retained fact pleading from earlier regimes. See infra
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The remaining notice states followed other paths.56  In
Iowa, it was not the original promulgation of rules, but a rule
amendment that led to notice pleading.57  In four states—Geor-
gia,58 Kansas,59 New York,60 and North Carolina61—the legisla-
ture accomplished this goal.  In New Jersey (and perhaps New
York as well), it appears that notice pleading developed as a
result of judicial drift.62  In sum, judicial rulemaking was the
primary way that notice pleading arose in the states, but it was
not alone.
Notice pleading versus fact pleading was the major split in
the 20th century, but the 21st century saw the entry of a new
contender: “plausibility pleading.”63  In the famed decisions
Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that to survive a
motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded allegations in a complaint,
taken as true, must plausibly show the pleader’s entitlement to
relief.64  The Court thus seemed to change the accepted plead-
ing standard not by rule amendment but by judicial decision.65
Appendix Table C.  I have more to say about Iowa and New Jersey shortly.  On the
flipside, it appears that Colorado had a version of notice pleading before it adopted
its rules-based system. See infra Appendix Table C.
56 As noted supra note 53, eleven states use fact pleading today. R
57 See IOWA CT. R. 1.402 Official Comment.
58 See Oakley & Coon, supra note 28, at 1392 (collecting sources on Georgia). R
59 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-208 (2018).
60 There is some dispute on this point.  Some sources attribute the shift to the
legislative adoption of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), see DAVID D.
SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 207-08 (5th ed. 2011), while others suggest judicial
decisions are responsible. See infra Appendix Table C.  Still others dispute
whether New York is properly characterized as “notice” or “fact” pleading. See,
e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, The Impact of Twombly on Antitrust Actions Brought in
the State Courts, 12 ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2013, at 1, 6 (“The New York standard
is thus a hybrid of notice pleading and fact pleading that requires a pleader not
only to put the defendant on notice of the claim, but also to set forth the elements
of its cause of action.”).
61 See 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 954; N.C. R. CIV. P. 8 cmts.; Sutton v. Duke, 176
S.E.2d 161, 164 (N.C. 1970); see also Oakley & Coon, supra note 28, at 1412 R
(“North Carolina switched from a conventional fact pleading code of procedure
when its legislature enacted the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
62 The New Jersey rule refers to the pleading of facts, but later decisions
applied notice pleading. See infra Appendix Table C.  For a discussion of New
York, see supra note 60. R
63 See Clermont, supra note 48, at 1355–59. R
64 See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
65 See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal
Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 557 (2010); see generally BURBANK &
FARHANG, supra note 1 (arguing that this method of federal procedural change has R
been the most important in recent decades).  Of course, it may have been the
federal courts before Twombly were misapplying Rule 8, and this decision brought
them back in line. See generally Redish, supra note 48. R
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Like notice pleading, plausibility pleading has made its way
to the states, but the institutional story of plausibility differs
profoundly from the notice-pleading precedent.66  Plausibility
entered state pleading law by judicial decision.  State courts in
at least Colorado, Massachusetts, Nebraska, South Dakota,
and Wisconsin adopted plausibility pleading without formal
changes to the state rules.67  Meanwhile, as I have documented
elsewhere, courts in at least nineteen states have expressly
rejected plausibility pleading.68  Indeed, some of these states
rejected plausibility pleading on institutional grounds, sug-
gesting that such a change should be the product of the state’s
usual procedure-making process, not a court decision.69  Al-
though no state rulemaking body has in fact adopted plausibil-
ity pleading in this way, it seems plausible—if not likely—that
one or more will do so eventually.
C. Making the Law of Class Actions
A second major example of procedure-making relates to
class actions.  Though the class-action device has deeper
roots,70 the modern damages class action arrived in federal
court with the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23.71  In other words, in the federal system, rule amend-
66 Note also that the process by which federal procedure shifted to plausibility
complicates how states should “mirror” the Federal Rules—if federal courts rein-
terpret a rule but do not amend it, what is a state court interpreting identical
words in a state rule to do? See Dodson, supra note 30, at 711–17. R
67 See infra Appendix Table C.
68 See Clopton, supra note 13, at 413 (citing cases from state courts in Ala- R
bama, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Ver-
mont, Washington, and West Virginia).
Note also that mere partisan affiliation does not explain these results.  To
determine partisanship, I used the method identified infra section II.B.4 as ap-
plied to all of the judges participating in the opinion adopting (or rejecting) plausi-
bility, cited in Appendix Table C.  Of the five state courts adopting plausibility,
Democrats controlled two, Republicans controlled two, and one was selected
through nonpartisan elections.  Meanwhile, of the state courts rejecting plausibil-
ity pleading, I was able to categorize seven as Democratic-controlled and five as
Republican-controlled.
69 See, e.g., Central Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings
LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 537 (Del. 2011) (“[W]e emphasize that, until this Court decides
otherwise or a change is duly effected through the Civil Rules process, the gov-
erning pleading standard in Delaware to survive a motion to dismiss [is un-
changed].” (emphasis added)).
70 See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO MOD-
ERN CLASS ACTION (1987).
71 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966
amendment.
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ment was the mechanism for this important procedural
change.72
In an early assessment of the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005,73 Professor Stephen Burbank identified state versions of
the 1966 amendments, concluding that all but a few states
eventually adopted equivalent rules.74  There is ample space to
debate what would constitute “adopting” those highly signifi-
cant amendments, but for present purposes, it is sufficient to
rely on Burbank’s characterization.75  Instead, the issue for
this survey—not reported in these terms by Burbank—is by
what mechanism states made this change.
Updating Burbank’s study, I determined the mechanism
by which each state adopted the 1966-style class action.76
Tracking the federal approach, the most common way for
states to introduce the 1966-style class action was by judicial
rule amendment, which occurred in twenty-four states.77  In
ten more states, the 1966-style class action arrived when the
state first introduced judicial-rule-based procedure sometime
after 1966.78  Meanwhile, in the code-based states of Kansas,
New York, Oklahoma, and Oregon, legislative amendment of
the procedure code introduced the modern class action.79  In at
least five states, judicial decisions introduced the 1966-style
class action, with later ratification by legislation or rule amend-
ment.80  Two states have no equivalent class-action rule, and
four have class-action approaches that predate, and did not
incorporate, the 1966 amendments.81
72 See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm
und Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 615–19 (2013).
73 See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
74 Stephen B. Burbank, Class Action Fairness Act, supra note 30, at 1544–51. R
75 See id.
76 Further documentation is available in Appendix Table D.
77 See infra Table A & Appendix Table D.
78 See id.
79 See id.; see also supra subpart I.A (identifying states that rely on legislation
versus judicial rulemaking).
80 See infra Table A & Appendix Table D.
81 Mississippi and Virginia have no equivalent class action rule, while Califor-
nia, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wisconsin have class-action rules that pre-
date, and did not incorporate, the 1966 amendments. See infra Table A &
Appendix Table D.  Note though that these states may allow similar types of class
actions without having a formal rule. See, e.g., TIMOTHY D. COHELAN, COHELAN ON
CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTIONS §§ 1:2–3 (2017–2018 ed.) (describing federal Rule 23 “as
guidance on novel class certification issues” under California law).
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TABLE A – STATE ADOPTION OF 1966-STYLE CLASS ACTION
Rule Amendment New Rules 
Alaska Nevada Alabama 
Arizona New Hampshire Idaho 
Colorado New Jersey Indiana 
Connecticut New Mexico Maryland 
Delaware North Dakota Massachusetts 
Florida Pennsylvania Michigan 
Hawaii Rhode Island Ohio 
Iowa South Dakota South Carolina 
Kentucky Texas Tennessee 
Maine Utah Vermont 
Minnesota Washington  
Missouri Wyoming  
Montana   
Legislative 
Amendment 
Judicial Decision No Formal  
1966-Style Rule 
Kansas Arkansas California 
New York Georgia Mississippi 
Oklahoma Illinois Nebraska 
Oregon Louisiana North Carolina 
 West Virginia Virginia 
  Wisconsin 
In sum, for state versions of the 1966 class action amend-
ments, judicial rulemaking was the most common, but not the
only, method of procedural change.
In case one suspects that this is purely a question of tim-
ing—that the 1960s were more amenable to rulemaking than
recent years—I also checked the 2003 amendments to the fed-
eral class action rule, which were among the most important
Rule 23 amendments since 1966.82  Building on an important
study by Professors Subrin and Main,83 I identified seventeen
states that updated their rules consistent with the 2003 federal
amendments.84  Thirteen states did so by judicial rule amend-
82 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003
amendment.
83 Subrin & Main, supra note 16, at 536. R
84 I updated Subrin and Main’s findings to reflect my reading of current law.
These results, along with the 1966 results, are reported in Appendix Table D.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 17 10-JAN-19 11:51
2018] MAKING STATE CIVIL PROCEDURE 17
ment.85  Five did so by legislative code amendment.86  Again,
rule amendment remains a viable method for significant proce-
dural reform.87
D. More Examples
Pleading and class actions, of course, are not the only im-
portant procedural issues.  In recent years, significant contro-
versy arose regarding amendments to Federal Rule 26 that
emphasized that the scope of discovery should be “proportional
to the needs of the case.”88  Criticism of “proportionality” has
been sharp.89
As of April 2018, seven states have adopted the new “pro-
portionality” language.90  Five of these seven states used judi-
cial rule amendment, while two used statutes.91  Meanwhile,
the Standing Advisory Committee on the Massachusetts Rules
of Civil and Appellate Procedure considered but expressly de-
clined to recommend adding this language to the Massachu-
setts rules.92  Even before “proportionality,” Utah’s Advisory
Committee announced in 2011 that it no longer found mirror-
ing the Federal Rules to be appropriate for the state.93
85 The states are Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix
Table D.
86 The states are California, Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma.
See infra Appendix Table D.
87 Adoption of 2003-style class action amendments, which were understood
to be pro-defendant, had a partisan tilt.  None of the eleven rules states with high
courts controlled by Democrats adopted versions of the 2003 class actions
amendments, while six of nineteen Republican-controlled rules states did.
88 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P.26 advisory committee’s note to
2015 amendment.  Note, though, that the language of proportionality predated
the 2015 amendment in another part of Rule 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 26 advisory
committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
89 E.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 6; Coleman, supra note 7, at R
1009–10; Simard, supra note 16, at 11; Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? R
Federal Civil Procedure after the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 28 (2016);
Subrin & Main, supra note 16, at 531; Suja A. Thomas & Dawson Price, How R
Atypical Cases Make Bad Rules: A Commentary on the Rulemaking Process, 15
NEV. L.J. 1141, 1150 (2015); Elizabeth Thornburg, Cognitive Bias, the “Band of
Experts,” and the Anti-Litigation Narrative, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 759–60 (2016).
90 Arizona (ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)(A)); Colorado (COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1));
Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-226(b)(1) (2018)); Minnesota (MINN. R. CIV. P.
26.02(b)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 3226(B)(1)(a) (2018)); Vermont (VT. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(1)); Wyoming (WYO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
91 See rules and statutes cited supra note 90. R
92 See MASS. R. CIV. P. 26, Reporters Note – 2016.
93 See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, UTAH: IMPACT OF THE REVISIONS TO RULE 26
ON DISCOVERY PRACTICE IN THE UTAH DISTRICT COURTS 1 (2015), https://www.ncsc
.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Civil%20Procedure/Utah%20Rule%2026%20
Evaluation%20Final%20Report(2015).ashx [https://perma.cc/HSJ4-ZZE6]
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Civil proceduralists also will be familiar with the conster-
nation surrounding proposed amendments to Federal Rule 68
on offers of judgment.94  In brief, in order to encourage settle-
ment, the federal advisory committee proposed strengthening
the penalties associated with rejecting an offer of judgment that
ultimately exceeded the final award, including by charging at-
torney fees to the rejecting side.95  Significant backlash led this
proposal to be dropped.96
I reviewed every state’s rules on offers of judgment.97  Eight
states include attorney-fee provisions in their offer of judgment
rules,98 with legislatures being responsible for four of the eight
provisions.99  Thirty-six states do not include attorney fees,
and six states do not have trans-substantive rules on offers of
judgment.100
I could go on.101
(quoting a memorandum filed by the Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Chief Justice); see also Simard, supra note
16, at 27 (discussing proportionality in state courts and Utah in particular). R
94 FED. R. CIV. P. 68.
95 See, e.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 132–33 (noting that the R
federal advisory committee “advanced proposals to amend Rule 68 that would
have measurably increased the risks of declining offer of judgement”); Robert G.
Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1609 (2008) [herein-
after Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”] (“The 1983 proposal . . . included fees in
the sanction subject to the court’s discretion.”).
96 See, e.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 132–33; Bone, “To En- R
courage Settlement,” supra note 95, at 1609. R
97 See infra Appendix Table E.
98 The states are Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada,
New Jersey, and Texas.  See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68; CONN. GEN STAT. § 52-192a
(2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79 (West 2018); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-68 (2018); MICH. CT. R. 2.405; NEV. R. CIV. P. 68; N.J. R. CT. 4:58-1 to -6;
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 42.004 (West 2018); TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.4.
South Carolina does not include fees but adds an 8% penalty. S.C. R. CIV. P. 68.
99 Connecticut and Georgia are states with legislative procedure codes, and
Florida and Texas are states with judge-made procedural rules but with statutes
addressing offers of judgment. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79; FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442;
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 42.004.; TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.4.
100 See infra Appendix Table E.
101 In 2015, the Supreme Court abrogated Federal Rule 84, which meant that
the “Appendix of Forms to the Civil Rules” were no longer authoritative.  See FED.
R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. See generally Brooke
D. Coleman, Abrogation Magic: The Rules Enabling Act Process, Civil Rule 84, and
the Forms, 15 NEV. L.J. 1093 (2015) (describing and lamenting this development).
At least five states have rescinded their “forms” rules this decade. KY. R. CIV. P. 84
(omitted); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 107 (repealed 2016); Administrative Order of the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Courts, AO/119/16 (May 23, 2016); MASS. R. CIV. P.
84 (repealed 2017), Reporter’s Notes—2017; UTAH R. CIV. P. 84 (repealed 2017);
WYO. R. CIV. P. 84 (forms removed); see also DEL. SUP. CT. R. 84 (omitted).  Yet
during the same period, Illinois added a rule on forms, Arizona reaffirmed its
commitment to forms, and Rhode Island amended its rule to direct people to the
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II
STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEES
The broad strokes of state procedure-making have much in
common with the federal system.  In most states, the highest
court promulgates rules of civil procedure.  Legislatures can
exercise lawmaking authority to affect procedure, and judges
may make decisions in their judicial capacity that effect proce-
dural changes.  These observations are not just theoretical—
they describe important procedural decisions about pleading,
class actions, discovery, settlement, and more.102
forms website. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 84 cmt.; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 10-101; R.I. SUP. CT. R. 84.
In total, I count at least twenty-four states with general rules providing for the
sufficiency of their forms. ALA. R. CIV. P. 84; ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 84; COLO. R. CIV. P. 84;
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.900; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-84 (2018); HAW. R. CIV. P. 84; ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 10-101; IND. TRIAL P. R. 82; IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.1901; ME. R. CIV. P. 84; MINN.
R. CIV. P. 84; MISS. R. CIV. P. 84; MO. SUP. CT. R. 49.01; MONT. R. CIV. P. 84; N.C. R.
CIV. P. § 1A-1, Rule 84; N.D. R. CIV. P. 84; N.J. R. 6:1; NEV. R. CIV. P. 84; OHIO R.
CIV. P. 84; OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 12, § 2026 (2018); R.I. SUPER. R. CIV. P. 84; S.D. R.
CIV. P. § 15-6-84 (also found at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-84 (2018)); VT. R. CIV. P.
84; W. VA. R. CIV. P. 84.
In Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme Court declared a new work-product doc-
trine for federal courts, rather than proceeding by rule amendment.  329 U.S.
495, 514 (1947); see Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 901, 922–23 (2002) (discussing Hickman).  Following that decision, a prior
edition of Wright & Miller documented about two dozen states dissenting from the
Hickman approach through procedural rule or statute.  8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2022, n.24 (2d ed. 1994).  It
identified eighteen states that adopted a version of the proposed (but not adopted)
Federal Rules amendment from 1946, and five other states that adopted a version
of the proposed (but not adopted) Federal Rules amendment from 1955. Id.  Nota-
bly, after Rule 26’s work-product provision was amended in 1970, thirty-four
states adopted a verbatim copy of the rule and ten more adopted functional
equivalents. Id. § 2023, nn.27–28.
On sanctions, Professor Madison observed that twenty-five states adopted a
version of “good faith” pleading rules that look like the post-1983 Federal Rule 11
(“majority approach”); nineteen adopted versions that look like the post-1993
Federal Rule (“minority approach”); and six states do not have Rule 11 equivalents
at all (“nonconforming state”). See MADISON, supra note 29, at 296–97; see also R
Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Diver-
gence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2037 (1989)
(discussing state responses to the Rule 11 amendments).  Note that code and rule
states behave roughly equally in Madison’s count.  There are four code states
adopting the majority approach, three adopting the minority approach, and two
are nonconforming. MADISON, supra note 29, at 296–97. R
102 One area where states differ markedly from the federal system, and from
each other, is in their method of selecting judges.  Whether those mechanisms
have direct effects on the content of state law is a difficult question beyond the
scope of this project, though it sets up nicely for future research on comparative
state law. Cf. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Ideological Consequences of Selection: A
Nationwide Study of the Methods of Selecting Judges, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1733
(2017) (discussing judicial selection methods and partisanship).
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But these descriptions are only part of the story.  In the
federal system, the Supreme Court’s exercise of rulemaking
authority depends heavily on a system of “advisory commit-
tees” made up primarily of judges and practitioners.103  The
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules considers and proposes
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.104  The
advisory committee’s proposals are transmitted to the Judicial
Conference through its Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (known as the “Standing Committee”) and if ap-
proved, they are ultimately sent to the Supreme Court for con-
sideration and potential adoption.105
At the forefront of attention to—and criticism of—the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules has been Professor Stephen
Burbank.  In the 1980s, Professor Burbank zeroed in on the
lack of transparency in the advisory committee process.106  His
criticisms led to the transparency-enhancing reforms de-
scribed in the Introduction and taken up again below.107
In more recent work, Burbank and political scientist Sean
Farhang have examined empirically the work and composition
of the federal advisory committee.108  Burbank and Farhang
analyzed proposed amendments to the Federal Rules that had
consequences for private enforcement.  They found a dramatic
trend toward pro-defendant proposals from 1960 to 2014:
“[T]he predicted probability that [a proposed amendment]
would favor plaintiffs went from highly likely at the beginning of
103 See also BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 77–82 (collecting member- R
ship). See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1007 (4th ed. 2013) (describing the history of the advisory com-
mittees); Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 25, 1131–37 (same).  The fed- R
eral advisory committee also includes academics and government officials.
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 77–82. R
104 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2018) (Rules Enabling Act). See generally
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 103 (collecting sources); Struve, supra note 24, at R
1103–19.
105 See sources cited supra note 104. R
106 As former Rules Committee Reporter Paul Carrington put it, Burbank “had
been temperately critical of the 1934 establishment of a rulemaking process that
lacked full transparency and sensitivity to potential substantive consequences.”
Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experi-
ence, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 615 (2010).
107 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90
WASH U. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2013) (“[T]he committee reluctantly embraced greater
transparency and public participation in the rulemaking process, a reform ac-
complished largely as a consequence of the scholarly critiques of Professor Ste-
phen Burbank.”); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text; infra note 259 R
and accompanying text.
108 BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 77–82; see also Stephen B. Burbank R
& Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
1543, 1587–88 (2014).
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the series to highly unlikely at the end.”109  Burbank and
Farhang also studied committee membership.110  The share of
judges on the committee relative to practitioners has increased
substantially over time.111  Among committee members, the
vast majority of judges had been appointed to the bench by
Republican presidents.112  Practitioners on the committee
skewed heavily toward corporate, defense-side lawyers, espe-
cially in recent years.113
This Part describes the states’ use of civil rules advisory
committees and presents the results of a large empirical study
of state advisory committee membership.114  In brief, state ad-
visory committees are quite common.  Their selection processes
often mirror the federal advisory committee, but the member-
ship of state committees differs on various dimensions from
federal membership today: there are substantially more practi-
tioners, and there is more balance among members of each
professional group.  On the other hand, I find that states are
not always publicly accessible in their procedure-making
processes.
A. State Advisory Committee Procedures
Researching state courts is decidedly more challenging
than researching the federal courts, but I have endeavored to
determine the process by which every state court system
adopts rule changes.  Of the forty-one rule-based states, it ap-
pears that at least thirty-five states have advisory committee-
like structures.115  This total does not include Oregon, which
as noted above, authorizes a committee to adopt rule changes
109 BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 95. R
110 Id at 77–82.  I discuss their results in more detail below as I survey the
state results.
111 Id. at 79.
112 Id. at 84–85.
113 Id. at 81.
114 This inquiry was entirely absent from the otherwise highly detailed studies
of state procedure mentioned supra note 44. R
115 Alabama; Alaska; Arizona; Arkansas; Colorado; Delaware; Florida; Hawaii;
Idaho; Indiana; Iowa; Kentucky; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Minnesota;
Mississippi; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Jersey;
New Mexico; North Dakota; Ohio; Pennsylvania; South Carolina; Tennessee;
Texas; Utah; Vermont; Virginia; Wisconsin; and Wyoming.  For citations to rele-
vant authorities, see Appendix Table A.
Note that, in South Carolina, a state court rule calls for the creation of a Rules
Advisory Committee and specifies a selection mechanism. See S.C. APP. CT. R.
609.  I have collected the most recent membership, but there is some evidence
that the committee is no longer active. See infra Appendix Table A.
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directly.116  Michigan, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washing-
ton, and West Virginia seemingly do not employ standing rules
committees.117
The next question is who appoints committee members.  In
the federal system, the Chief Justice has the authority to ap-
point members of the advisory committee.118  It has not es-
caped notice that since 1953, every Chief Justice has been
appointed by a Republican president, and the Republican
chiefs have exercised their appointment authority in ways that
have drawn criticism regarding balance.119
Turning to the states, committee members are selected by
the state high court in at least twenty-three of the thirty-five
states with committees: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, and Wyoming.120  Four states expressly authorize se-
lection by the Chief Justice: Alaska, Hawaii, North Dakota, and
Virginia.121  Among the states in these two groups, I cannot
establish the de facto division of authority, meaning that it is
possible that some of these states in practice rely on the entire
court while others effectively delegate authority to the Chief
Justice.
116 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. R
117 For citations to relevant authorities, see Appendix Table A.
118 See supra notes 103–104 (collecting sources). R
119 See, e.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 83–91 (studying judge R
members since 1970).  The Chief’s potential partisan inclinations have been rele-
vant to other administrative functions too, though not all of them. See, e.g.,
Andrew D. Bradt & Zachary D. Clopton, MDL v. Trump: The Puzzle of Public Law in
Multidistrict Litigation, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 905, 925–26 (2018) (noting that recent
Chief Justices have selected Republican-appointed judges for the advisory com-
mittees and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, but not for the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation); James E. Pfander, The Chief Justice, the Ap-
pointment of Inferior Officers, and the “Court of Law” Requirement, 107 NW. U. L.
REV. 1125, 1135 (2013) (noting some scholars belief that Chief Justice Rehnquist
took a partisan approach to judicial appointments); Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg,
Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief
Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1604 (2006) (same); Theodore
W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 341, 390–95 (2004) (examining empirical evidence regarding the appointments
of Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist).
120 For citations to relevant authorities, see Appendix Table A.  I do not include
Kentucky here because, despite numerous requests, the Clerk of the Supreme
Court of Kentucky declined to provide the relevant information.
121 For citations to relevant authorities, see Appendix Table A.
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The remaining states have varied approaches.  In Ari-
zona122 and Florida,123 a standing committee is appointed by
the State Bar Association.124  Delaware courts rely on two bod-
ies: one appointed by the trial court and one appointed by the
high court.125  Four states have mixed-appointment systems
specified by rule or statute, such that appointment authority is
shared among some combination of the high court, the lower
courts, bar associations or other professional groups, the state
public defender, the governor, the attorney general, the legisla-
ture (or some subset of legislators), and law school deans.126
Among the states with “standard” advisory committees, at
least three formally constrain membership otherwise selected
by the state high court:
• Minnesota: The Supreme Court must appoint an advisory
committee comprised of “eight members of the bar of the
state, one judge of the Court of Appeals, and two judges of
the district court . . . .”127
• South Carolina: The members shall be “(1) a circuit court
judge who shall serve as the chair of the Committee; (2) a
circuit court judge or a master-in-equity; (3) a family court
judge; (4) a probate judge; (5) a magistrate or municipal
court judge; (6) four regular members of the South Caro-
lina Bar; and, (7) a non-voting reporter.”128
• Vermont: The members shall be “two Superior and/or Dis-
trict Court Judges, one superior court clerk, the chair of
the Vermont Bar Association corresponding standing
122 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-110; see also Main, supra note 21, at 860 (citing R
STATE BAR OF ARIZ., STANDING COMMITTEE GUIDELINES 1 (2013)).
123 FL. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.140.
124 Arizona also has a Task Force appointed by its Chief Justice. See SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZ., Order No. 2014-116, IN THE MATTER OF: ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ARIZONA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, ADMIN. ORDER (2014).
125 The Delaware Superior Courts established a Civil Rules Advisory Commit-
tee appointed by the president judge of the Superior Court. See SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF DEL., IN RE: POLICY, TIME STANDARDS, AND PROCEDURES RELATING TO
CIVIL CASE DISPOSITION, CIVIL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER (2000), http://
courts.delaware.gov/superior/pdf/civiladmord.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZU7-
B2FN].  At the same time, under the Delaware Constitution, the Supreme Court
has constitutional supervisory authority over the superior court rules. DEL.
CONST. art. 4, § 13.  Pursuant to that authority, the Supreme Court Rules call for
the creation of a permanent Advisory Committee on Supreme Court Rules, Rules
of Civil Procedure, and Rules of Evidence, with members appointed by the Su-
preme Court. DEL. SUP. CT. R. 93.
126 These states are Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Wisconsin. See
MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-3-65; N.H. SUP. CT. R. 51; OHIO R. PRAC. & P. COMMISSION § 3;
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 758.13; see also infra Appendix Table A (quoting these provi-
sions in full).
127 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.052 (West 2018).
128 S.C. APP. CT. R. 609.
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committee (to the extent that one exists), and seven other
members to be appointed by the Supreme Court.”129
Finally, Iowa has a court rule announcing a policy of gen-
der balance that seems to apply here: “It is a policy of the
judicial branch that all boards, commissions, and committees
to which appointments are made or confirmed by any part of
the judicial branch shall reflect, as much as possible, a gender
balance.”130  Iowa’s committee today is comprised of more wo-
men than men.131
B. State Advisory Committee Membership
Advisory committee membership may have meaningful
consequences for civil procedure.  Therefore, in addition to un-
derstanding the mechanisms for state committee appointment,
I also have endeavored to determine the composition of state
committees.
I have been able to determine the members of thirty-four of
the thirty-five state advisory committees, comprising 682 total
observations.132  Although the most thorough study would col-
lect data over time, this task is both significantly more difficult
for state courts than their federal equivalent, and it would in-
volve substantially more observations.  For comparison, taking
yearly measurements of the federal advisory committee, one
would need about fifty years of federal data to equal the num-
ber of state observations in this paper.
Having collected the identities of the current members of
state advisory committees, I coded each observation across a
range of dimensions including profession, race, sex, and parti-
san affiliation.133  This research relied first on Westlaw’s
“profiler” tools (including its “reports” feature), followed by vari-
ous publicly available sources.  I also contacted by email vari-
ous practitioner and academic members of state committees.
These data are not spotless—some characteristics for some
individuals were not available or were ambiguous—but the
129 VT. SUPREME COURT, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
Admin. Order 17 (1979) (on file with author).
130 IOWA CT. R. 22.34.
131 See infra Appendix Table A.
132 I use membership as of July 1, 2017.  As noted above, I lack membership
data for Kentucky. See supra note 120.
133 I will say more about these coding decisions as they come up.
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gaps are not systematic and thus general descriptive observa-
tions are still possible.134
I should note that this study cannot account for the rela-
tive weight of each member’s contribution.  It may be that on
some committees the chair controls the agenda, while on
others the law professor serving as “reporter” plays a major
role.  But this first-cut analysis can help shed light on compar-
ative procedure-making in the federal and state systems.135
1. Profession
Tracking Burbank and Farhang, the first level of analysis is
the professional category.  In particular, committee members
are typically judges, practitioners, academics, or government
officials.136
In the federal system, Burbank and Farhang observed a
dramatic increase over time in the proportion of judges relative
to the other categories.  In particular, prior to Chief Justice
Burger’s reconstitution of the federal advisory committee in
1971, judges represented about 18% of the committee.137  This
describes, for example, the committee that took the lead on the
important 1966 amendments to Rule 23.138  The proportion of
judges jumped to almost 70% under Burger and has remained
at about this level.139  Practitioners, who had been the majority
before Burger, have since hovered around 25%.140  Burbank
and Farhang explained that the increase in judicial member-
ship was linked with a desire to protect the institutional inter-
ests of the judiciary and, perhaps, to the Chief Justice’s
perception that he would have more influence over judicial
members.141
134 The one exception is race, for which I suspect the gaps are systematic.
Below, I explain further how I interpret these results. See infra note 155 and R
accompanying text.
135 See, e.g., Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1658–64 (1995); Procedures for the Conduct of Business by
the Judicial Conference Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 195
F.R.D. 386, 386–87 (2000).
136 For Burbank and Farhang, “government official” meant the ex officio fed-
eral government representative on the committee. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra
note 1, at 77.  For states, I include any government employee, which could include R
court employees other than judges (such as the clerk of court), high officials (such
as the state attorney general or a state legislator), or other government employees
(such as lower-level attorneys in the state AG’s office).
137 See id. at 78–79.
138 See id. at 72–77; see also supra subpart I.C (discussing class actions).
139 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 78–79. R
140 See id.
141 See id. at 98; see also infra Part III.
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In the states, practitioners vastly outnumber judges.  My
data reveal that state advisory committees are on average 56%
practitioners, 27% judges, 13% government, and 4% academ-
ics.142  (New Hampshire also requires lay membership.143)
Comparing these results to the federal system, the state ratios
are closer to Chief Justice Warren’s 1960 appointments than
anything we have seen since that time.144
I also find that state partisanship does not seem to affect
the relative proportions of committee-member professions.  The
data do not vary meaningfully with either the partisan results
in the 2016 presidential election145 or the partisan control of
the state high court.146
2. Gender and Race
Gender and race are the next relevant categories.  Though
Burbank and Farhang’s book analyzed gender and race for
judges only,147 they kindly shared their collection of data on
the full membership of the federal advisory committee.148  Be-
cause diversity norms have changed over time, I used Burbank
and Farhang’s results only since 2000 (rather than from the
entire existence of the federal committee).  From these data I
determined that women represented only 13% of committee
years since 2000 and nonwhite members represented less than
7% of committee years since 2000.149
142 Of the government officials, about 50% are state executive branch officials
or attorneys, 40% are court or other administrative staff, and 10% are legislators
or legislative staff.
143 See infra Appendix Table A. Wisconsin requires the governor to appoint
members of the public to the Judicial Council, though they do not necessarily
serve on the civil rules committee. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 758.13; see also Wiscon-
sin Judicial Council, https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/committees/judicial
council/index.htm [https://perma.cc/2BDD-JVYM].  Oregon requires lay mem-
bership on its rulemaking council as well. See supra note 35 (discussing Oregon). R
144 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 71, 77–79. R
145 States voting for Hillary Clinton were 52% practitioners, 28% judges, 15%
government, and 4% academics.  States voting for Donald Trump were 58% prac-
titioners, 26% judges, 12% government, and 5% academics.
146 Among states for which I could identify partisan control of the high court,
Democratic states were 62% practitioners, 24% judges, 11% government, and 2%
academics.  Republican states were 54% practitioners, 27% judges, 14% govern-
ment, and 5% academics.
147 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 86. R
148 Their data-collection method is described in id. at 84–85.  To determine
race and gender, I used my methods described above.
149 Looking at the entire history of the federal committee, Brooke Coleman
finds that more than 85% of members have been white men.  Brooke D. Coleman,
#SoWhiteMale: Federal Civil Rulemaking, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 52, 62 (2018).
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Turning to the states, although I was unable to identify the
sex and race of every committee member, I can report on those
members for which information was available.  On gender, I
was able to identify 205 female members,150 meaning that state
committees are at least 30% female.151  This is consistent with
the proportion of female state judges overall,152 and it is sub-
stantially more representative than the federal advisory com-
mittee (only 13% since 2000).153  The professional categories of
the female committee members were at parity with state com-
mittees overall.154
For race and ethnicity, white committee members were not
routinely identified as “white.”  However, based on publicly
available information, I was able to identify fifty-four nonwhite
members,155 meaning that state advisory committees are no
less than 8% nonwhite.156  These results are roughly in line
with the federal advisory committee.157  State committees are
less representative than state judiciaries overall, though I
would note that my race data are particularly imprecise.158
Finally, like women, nonwhite members of state committees
150 For example, many media sources identify female lawyers and many em-
ployer biographies use gendered pronouns.  I treat these as accurate for purposes
of this study.  Though there may be errors, I do not see any reason that they would
be systematic.
151 I say at least 30% because I am dividing the 205 women by the total
number of members (including some for whom I have not been able to identify
gender).
152 See Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Measuring Justice in State Courts:
The Demographics of the State Judiciary, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1887, 1908 (2017)
(finding that women hold about 30% of state judgeships).
153 According to data provided by the Federal Judicial Center, women occu-
pied approximately 26% of federal judgeships in 2017. See Federal Judicial
Center, Gender, https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/gender
[https://perma.cc/8ETW-8B7K].
154 Female committee members were 51% practitioners (versus 56% overall),
30% judges (versus 26% overall), 17% government (versus 13% overall), and 3%
academics (versus 4% overall).
Women were slightly more likely to be selected in states that voted for the
Republican presidential candidate in 2016 (32% female) than the Democratic
candidate (30% female).
155 For example, members occasionally self-identify race in publicly available
documents, or they are characterized as belonging to a certain racial or ethnic
group in public reports.
156 As above, I say at least 8% because I am dividing by the total number of
committee members even though I have not identified every member’s race.
157 Again, using Burbank and Farhang’s data I find that the federal committee
included 7% nonwhite members since 2000. See supra note 148 and accompany- R
ing text.
158 See George & Yoon, supra note 152, at 1908 (finding about 20% of state R
judgeships are held by nonwhites).  According to data provided by the Federal
Judicial Center, nonwhites occupied approximately 20% of federal judgeships in
2017. See Federal Judicial Center, Race and Ethnicity, https://www.fjc.gov/his
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are distributed proportionately among professional
categories.159
3. Practitioners
Further analysis requires subdividing the members by pro-
fessional category.  For various reasons, not least of which are
their small numbers, government officials and academics are
the least interesting categories, so I will not analyze them fur-
ther.160  Instead, this subsection discusses practitioners and
the next subsection discusses judges.
To better understand practitioners, Burbank and Farhang
classify practitioner members along two dimensions: plaintiff-
side versus defense-side, and individual clients versus corpo-
rate clients.161  In their federal data, Burbank and Farhang
find rough parity on both measures in 1960, trending dramati-
cally toward defense-side and corporate since that time.162
This decade, the ratios are around two-to-one on both mea-
sures, favoring defense-side and corporate lawyers.163  Though
they are careful about making causal claims, these trends co-
incide with their observation that the federal advisory commit-
tee’s work product has trended toward anti-plaintiff proposals
during this period.164
Turning to the states, I identified 381 practitioner mem-
bers in the sample.  Using Westlaw’s litigation history reports,
and occasionally other sources, I coded practitioners (when
possible165) along Burbank and Farhang’s two dimensions.166
For practitioners who could be coded as primarily plaintiff-side
or defense-side, I find 43% plaintiff-side and 57% defense-
tory/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/race-and-ethnicity [https://perma.cc/B9HH-
YAAN].
159 The nonwhite state members represent about 8% of all judge members and
10% of practitioner members.  Among nonwhite members, 29% are judges and
69% are practitioners.
160 For limited analysis on state government members, see supra note 136. R
161 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 79–82.  Note that individual R
clients include attorneys representing classes of individuals.  In addition to these
two categories, I also coded for sex and race.  State practitioner members are at
least 27% female and at least 10% nonwhite.
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 See id. at 91–103.
165 If practitioner data were unavailable, or if practitioners represented
roughly equal numbers of the two categories, I did not code them.
166 Of course, there are shortcomings in these reports, but again, the goal here
is not causal inference, so these imperfections are not problematic.
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side.167  Using the same sources, I identified 42% of practition-
ers as having client bases that were primarily individual, and
58% that were primarily corporate.  Standardizing for commit-
tee membership, these latter results are even closer: 47% indi-
vidual and 53% corporate.168  Note also that every state
committee had a mix of practitioners representing corporate
and individual clients.169  Anecdotally, a substantial number of
practitioner members themselves represented a mix of corpo-
rate and individual clients, and a mix of plaintiffs and
defendants.170
Though these data do not account for the pool of potential
practitioners—and, of course, this is just a snapshot of state
committees—these percentages give us a rough picture of the
practitioners who help make state rules of civil procedure.  In
short, corporate and defense-side lawyers outnumber individ-
ual and plaintiff-side lawyers in state committees, but their
numbers are close to even—and they are much closer to even
than we have observed in the federal advisory committee in
recent years.171
In addition, recall that practitioners are a significant ma-
jority on state advisory committees.172  So not only is there
closer parity between individual and corporate lawyers and be-
tween plaintiff and defense lawyers on state committees, but
individual and plaintiff lawyers make up an even larger propor-
tion of total committee membership in the states as compared
with the federal system.173
167 Standardizing for committee size, I also find that state committees are, on
average, 57% defense-side and 43% plaintiff-side.  To standardize for committee
size, I determined the proportion of plaintiff-side and defense-side attorneys
within each committee and then averaged across them.
168 To standardize for committee size, I determined the proportion of attorneys
with primarily corporate and individual clients within each committee, and then
averaged across them.
169 All but three had a mix of practitioners with primarily defense-side and
plaintiff-side clients.  Committees in the three outlier states included multiple
attorneys with mixed client bases of their own.
170 For example, state-court family-law practitioners (rare in federal court)
routinely represent plaintiffs and defendants; small-scale commercial litigators
also may represent plaintiffs or defendants and corporate or individual clients.
See, e.g., Simard, supra note 16, at 8 (contrasting federal- and state-court litiga- R
tion).  Burbank and Farhang also observed that committee members with mixed
client bases were much more common in the early years of the federal advisory
committee than today. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 82. R
171 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
172 See supra section II.B.1.
173 If my practitioner data were representative of state committees, then we
would expect roughly one-quarter of all state committee members to be plaintiff-
side and individual-client lawyers.
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4. Judges
The other significant category of committee members is
judges.  Burbank and Farhang report on the appointing presi-
dent, race, and gender of Article III judges serving on the fed-
eral advisory committee.174  Burbank and Farhang report that
Republican-appointed judges held 70% of the judge seats from
1970-2014, and were a majority on the committee in forty-one
of forty-three years.175  To put it another way, Republican-ap-
pointed judges are 150% more likely to be appointed to the
federal advisory committee than Democratic appointed
judges.176  Burbank and Farhang also find that nonwhite
judges are significantly less likely to be appointed—they com-
prise only 2% of committee years.177  Looking only since 2000,
nonwhite judges comprise about 7% of the judge years.178
Burbank and Farhang’s data also reveal that women judges
made up about 12% of the all committee years, and 18% since
2000.179
Turning to the state data, I first report information on the
sex and race of judge members.  Using the same methods as
above, I find that about one-third of judges on state committees
are female.180  I was able to identify 9% of state judges as
nonwhite, though again, the data on race are far from com-
plete.  These data compare favorably to the federal results.181
Indeed, female judges are much more likely to serve on state
committees than the federal equivalent.182
Ideology is somewhat more complicated to report, given the
manifold mechanisms by which state judges are appointed.  In
174 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 83–91.  Their work was aided by R
the fact that every Article III judge has been appointed in the same manner (and
necessarily by a single president of one of two political parties), see U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, and that the Federal Judicial Center produces a publicly available
biography for each judge.  Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Article
III Federal Judges, 1789-present, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://
perma.cc/CJ6H-RXYA].
175 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 84–91. R
176 See id.
177 See id. During the same period, nonwhite judges comprised 11% of overall
judge years. Id.
178 These race data were not published in the text but provided to the author
by Burbank and Farhang. See supra note 144.
179 These gender data were not published in the text but provided to the
author by Burbank and Farhang. See supra note 144.
180 My finding of 34% is slightly higher than the 30% overall share of state
judgeships occupied by women. See George & Yoon, supra note 152, at 1907. R
181 See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text. R
182 Recall that women represented 12% of federal committee years and 18%
since 2000.  Women represent 22% of judges on the current federal committee.
See supra note 179 and accompanying text. R
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the sample, I coded judges for political party based on a combi-
nation of two factors.  First, I identified the political party of the
governor (or legislative majority) that initially appointed the
judge to her current seat.  Second, I identified the political
party associated with any partisan candidacy of the judge her-
self—often a partisan judicial election to the judge’s current
appointment, but not limited to those elections.183  Of the 181
judges, 52% were coded as Republican, 32% as Democratic,
2% as Independent, and 14% as nonpartisan.  Excluding the
nonpartisan judges, state committee judges are 61% Republi-
can, 37% Democratic, and 2% Independent.  Finally, standard-
izing by committee membership, Republicans are 57% of
partisan judges, Democrats are 40%, and Independents are
3%.184
Again, the state data seem to be skewed in the same direc-
tion as the federal data—here, toward Republican judges as
committee members—but the magnitude of the effect is
weaker.  Recall that Republican judges make up 70% of the
federal committee185 but only about 60% of state committees.
Or, while Republican judges were a majority in 95% of federal
committee years,186 Republican judges are a majority on 63%
of state committees, tied on 7%, and a minority on 30%.
Moreover, while Democratic and Republican appointees re-
present roughly equal shares of the federal judiciary,187 the
Republican skew of elected state officials suggests that the pool
of state judges may skew Republican as well.188  As a result,
183 So, for example, if a judge previously ran for state senate as a Democrat
and later won a nonpartisan election as a judge, she would be coded as a Demo-
crat.  Similarly, if a judge is appointed by a partisan governor, but then wins
reelection as a nonpartisan candidate, I code the judge to match the appointing
governor’s party.
184 To standardize for committee size, I determined the proportion of judges
from each party within each committee, and then averaged across them.  So, for
example, the fact that Texas has a large committee (including eleven of twelve
judges with Republican affiliations) would not skew these data.
185 See supra notes 175–176 and accompanying text. R
186 See supra notes 175–176 and accompanying text. R
187 See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 174. R
188 See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, State Vote 2016,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/statevote-2016.aspx
[https://perma.cc/GDC9-YCDA] (noting that after the 2016 election, “Republi-
cans will control 66 of the 98 partisan state legislative chambers”); Reid Wilson,
Republicans Will Completely Control 26 States, THE HILL (Aug. 3, 2017), http://the
hill.com/homenews/state-watch/345232-republicans-will-completely-control-a-
quarter-of-the-states [https://perma.cc/9JNT-YJUB] (“[T]he GOP now controls all
levers of government in 26 states across the country . . . .”).  Brian Fitzpatrick took
up a different task, studying the ideology of state appellate judges relative to their
electorates. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 102, at 1732.  Fitzpatrick finds that, in R
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state advisory committees are likely more representative of the
population of available judges than the federal committee is.
5. Modeling Practitioners and Judges
The foregoing analysis compared the state committees to
their federal counterpart, but we also might wonder whether
there are interstate effects that predict the identities of practi-
tioners and judges.
I do not find a partisan effect in the selection of practition-
ers.  The results on plaintiff versus defense and individual ver-
sus corporate are about the same if we separate states based
on the 2016 presidential election,189 the partisan affiliation of
the Chief Justice,190 or the partisan affiliation of the high
court.191  Using various statistical techniques, none of the dif-
ferences is statistically significant.192
There is, however, a partisan effect for judge selection.
Looking first at the 2016 presidential results, judge members
in red states are 67% Republican while judge members in blue
states are only 54% Republican.  Looking at control of the state
high court, the results are even starker.193  In states where I
virtually every state, judges are to the political left of the general public when
measured by the judges’ campaign contributions. Id. at 1745.  He also finds that
this effect is weakest in states that use partisan elections. Id. at 1748; see also
Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The
Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Introduce Ideology into Judicial Selec-
tion, 60 J.L. & ECON. 559, 560 (2017) (comparing judges to lawyers).
I attempted to use Bonica and Sen’s “campaign finance score” (“cf scores”)
data to assess the partisan affiliation of state judge members, see id. at 561, but cf
scores were available for only about 30% of judge members in this study.  There-
fore, I do not find those results trustworthy.  For reader interest, the average cf
score of judges for whom scores were available was about -.20, with negative
referring to liberal.  This result is to the left of state judges overall. See id.
189 In Democratic states, practitioners are 57% corporate and 57% defense-
side; in Republican states, practitioners are 58% corporate and 57% defense-side.
190 In states with Democratic Chief Justices, practitioners are 57% corporate
and 56% defense-side; in states with Republican Chief Justices, practitioners are
55% corporate and 58% defense-side.
191 In Democratic-controlled states, practitioners are 55% corporate and 62%
defense-side; in Republican-controlled states, practitioners are 61% corporate
and 57% defense-side.
192 Using a chi-squared test, the p values are as follows: corporate by presi-
dent (p = .8473); defense by president (p = .8936); corporate by chief justice (p =
.5335); defense by chief justice (p = .7913); corporate by high court (p = .2512);
defense by high court (p = .4271).  Similarly, using a two-sample t test, there is not
a significant difference in the share of defense-side or corporate attorneys based
on any of the measures of state partisanship.  There, the p values are as follows:
corporate by president (p = .5128); defense by president (p = .5685); corporate by
chief justice (p = .7102); defense by chief justice (p = .7035); corporate by high
court (p = .8776); defense by high court (p = .6608).
193 See supra note 183 (describing the method). R
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can identify partisan control of the high court, Democratic
committee judges outnumber Republicans about 60–40 in
Democratic-controlled states, while Republicans outnumber
Democrats 70–30 in Republican-controlled states.194
More formally, I ran a regression with the outcome variable
being the share of Republican judges on the committee, and
predictor variables for the partisan outcome of the 2016 presi-
dential election and partisanship of the high court and chief
justice.  There was a significant relationship (p = .033) only
between partisan high court and Republican share.195
These results track the federal data.  Republican judges
dominate the federal committee, and it has been Republican
Chief Justices who have selected federal committee mem-
bers.196  In the states, Republican high courts (and Republican
chiefs) are more inclined to pick Republican judges, and the
same is true for Democrats.  Though, again, the magnitudes of
the effects—and their comparison to the overall populations—
are less substantial for state committees.197
In short, therefore, state committees exhibit some partisan
tilt in the selection of judges but no partisan effects in the
selection of practitioner members.198  And, again, practitioners
comprise a more substantial share of state committee member-
ship overall.199
194 Similarly, states with Democratic chiefs are 53% Republican while states
with Republican chiefs are 64% Republican. See supra note 183 (describing R
method).
195 A comparison of means (two-sample t test) also reveals a statistically signif-
icant difference between states with high courts controlled by Democrats and
Republicans (p = .0136).
196 See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. R
197 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. R
198 It is more challenging to evaluate the consequences of these results, both
due to the complexity of the legal system and the infrequency of outputs.  I ran
logistic regressions where the outcomes were the state rules on pleading, the 2003
class-action amendments, the fee-shifting provisions in offer of judgment rules,
and the “proportionality” standard for discovery. See supra subparts I.B–D.  Ex-
planatory variables were the proportion of Republican versus Democratic judges,
proportion of corporate versus individual attorneys, proportion of defense-side
versus plaintiff-side attorneys, the current partisan orientation of the high court
and chief justice, and the partisan results of the 2016 election.  The only statisti-
cally significant association I identified was between the 2003 class-action
amendments and state partisanship (i.e., the 2016 presidential results).  None of
the measures of committee composition was significantly associated with any of
the outputs.
199 See supra section II.B.1.
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6. Data Summary
Like the federal system, most states use advisory commit-
tees, and most advisory committees are appointed by state high
courts or chief justices.  But when it comes to advisory commit-
tee membership, state committee members today differ sub-
stantially from their federal counterparts.
Consider a comparison between the state committees in
2017 and the federal committee since 2000:






























Federal Committee (since 2000)
State Committees (2017)
Or, we could consider just 2017.  The 2017 federal commit-
tee was comprised of eight judges, four practitioners, an aca-
demic, and a government official.200  Were we to create a
composite 2017 state committee, the most striking difference is
that we would need to double the number of practitioners and
halve the number of judges.  More granularly, on the federal
committee, 25% of practitioners represent primarily individual
clients; on our state committee, that share should be ap-
proaching 50% of practitioners.  Around 70% of the federal
judge members are Republican; the state committee would
have only two Republicans among four judges.
200 See United States Courts, Committee Membership Selection, http://www.
uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/committee-membership-
selection [https://perma.cc/W4VB-ZX6P].
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C. State Rulemaking Accessibility
Before leaving the study of state advisory committees, I
should also address the issue of accessibility.  As mentioned
above, criticism of the federal advisory committee reached a
boiling point in the 1980s.201  Congress responded by amend-
ing the Rules Enabling Act to require more process, including
requiring that the federal advisory committees hold open meet-
ings after sufficient notice and requiring that all proposed rules
are subject to notice and comment,202 though not “Notice and
Comment.”203
My review of state rulemaking reveals that there is sub-
stantial variation among the states.  For every state with an
advisory committee, I inquired whether committee meetings
were open to the public.  For all 41 rules states, I inquired
whether proposed rule changes were published before they
were adopted.  (Whether code states should be considered ac-
cessible is a question for another time.)
Among the thirty-five states with advisory committees,
fourteen states have public meetings with centralized notice
procedures.204  At least twenty-one states either do not typi-
cally open their meetings to the public or do not routinely give
notice to the public of upcoming meetings.205  On proposed
rules, most rules states publish their proposed rules before
adoption, but at least four states do not.206  I describe these
results in detail in Appendix B.  For interested parties, Appen-
dix B also includes information on where to find proposed rules
and committee meetings.207
201 See, e.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 103–12. R
202 See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702
§§ 401 & 403 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073(c)(2), (d)
(2018)); see also BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 103–12. R
203 Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (requirements for notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing under the Administrative Procedures Act).  The APA does not apply to the
Federal Rules, though some think it should. See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen
Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Ad-
ministrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1188 (2012).
204 See infra Appendix Table B.  Oregon also has public meetings for its
rulemaking Council. See supra note 35 and accompany text (discussing Oregon). R
For the reader’s benefit, I have included information on Oregon’s meetings in
Appendix Table B.
205 See infra Appendix Table B.  Twelve states do not have open meetings;
seven states have open meetings but no centralized location for notices; and one
state does not advertise meetings and does not have a policy on whether a mem-
ber of the public would be permitted to attend.  Additional variation is docu-
mented in Appendix Table B.
206 See infra Appendix Table B.
207 See infra Appendix Table B.
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Meetings not open &
Rules published
Meetings not open &
Rules not published
Finally, my anecdotal experiences with this project re-
vealed additional hurdles to accessibility.  Accessing the rele-
vant information was a substantial challenge.  To the best of
my knowledge, the membership of the advisory committees in
eleven states was not available online, and multiple online lists
were out of date until I alerted relevant record keepers.208  Even
the court orders and other formal legal documents authorizing
various stages of rulemaking were not easily accessible in
many states (at least for an out-of-town researcher).209  I was
able to collect these documents only through substantial effort,
leveraging existing contacts and my willingness to be a pest.
III
DISCUSSION
The foregoing analysis reveals important differences be-
tween federal and state procedure, and between federal and
state procedure-making.  These differences are meaningful in
their own right, and they point to potential reforms for proce-
dure-making at all levels.
208 See infra Appendix Table A.
209 See infra Appendix Table A.
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First, as demonstrated in Part I, state procedure differs in
content from federal procedure.210  For those critics of federal
procedural retrenchment, the states represent a meaningful
alternative.211  A litigant filing a federal civil-rights claim, for
example, might prefer a state with notice pleading to a federal
court applying Twombly and Iqbal.212  The content of civil pro-
cedure also differs among the states.213  Whatever forces ex-
plain these interstate differences, it appears that state
procedure-making has tapped into the experimentalist virtue of
federalism214—a virtue that, in practice, is often unfulfilled.215
Turning to procedure-making, the most striking difference
is the substantially greater role for practitioners on state advi-
sory committees.216  Critics of the federal process have worried
that a committee stacked with judges will over-privilege judicial
interests and will be too easily controlled by the Chief Justice,
who might manipulate that control for ideological ends.217
210 See supra sections I.B–D; see also Clopton, supra note 13, at 424–42 R
(collecting examples).
211 Clopton, supra note 13, at 424–45.  Of course, reasonable people can disa- R
gree about the propriety of various packages of procedural rules.  That is why I
address this claim to audiences critical of federal procedure.
212 See id. at 426 (collecting sources on state courts applying state notice
pleading to Section 1983 claims after Twombly).
213 See id. at 424–42.
214 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124
HARV. L. REV. 4, 74 (2010) (virtues of federalism); Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1492–93 (1994) (same); Michael W. McCon-
nell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491
(1987) (same).  I do not mean to suggest that states are consciously experimenting
in a scientific way, only that they are producing diverse policy mixes that may
permit learning.  For a similar inquiry into state administrative independence, see
generally Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, 117 MICH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019).
215 See, e.g., Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy
Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1338 (2009) (dis-
cussing political-science literature on policy diffusion and noting that states ex-
periment less than is optimal); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980)
(discussing theoretical problems with relying on federalism for experimentation).
216 See supra Part II.
217 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 78–79; Janet Cooper Alexander, R
Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
647, 648–49 (1994); Mark W. Bennett, Essay: The Grand Poobah and Gorillas in
Our Midst: Enhancing Civil Justice in the Federal Courts—Swapping Discovery
Procedures in the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and Other Reforms
Like Trial by Agreement, 15 NEV. L.J. 1293, 1312–13 (2015); Coleman, supra note
7, at 1017–19; Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of R
Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 290 (2009); Patricia W. Hatamyar
Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees,
83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1140–44 (2015); Struve, supra note 24, at 1109–10; R
Thomas & Price, supra note 89, at 1157 (2015); Thornburg, supra note 89, at 755; R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 38 10-JAN-19 11:51
38 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1
Both of these concerns may be allayed by the presence of prac-
titioners on committees.
First, practitioners are a natural check on judicial
rulemakers’ institutional interest in aggrandizing judge au-
thority to the detriment of parties’ interests or other values.218
Famously articulated by Professor Judith Resnik,219 a major
concern with “managerial judges” is that their case-manage-
ment authority will erode due-process protections built into
ordinary adjudication.220  Although lawyers in theory can pro-
tect their clients’ interests, lawyers in active litigation are ham-
pered in their ability to resist judicial overreach because the
same judge they would challenge also would decide their
case.221  But attorney rulemakers should be less constrained—
and, indeed, rulemaking has been identified as an important
way to regulate managerial judging.222  The simple claim here
is that rule-based responses to judicial overreach may be more
vigorous when there are more attorneys participating in
rulemaking.
Second, critics of federal rulemaking have worried about
excessive control by the Chief Justice.  Burbank and Farhang,
for example, explained that Chief Justice Burger might have
been inclined to appoint judges to the federal advisory commit-
tee as a “control strategy” with ideological goals.223  Practi-
tioner members may be better insulated from the sway of their
state’s high court.224  There are also reasons to suspect that
practitioners will be more ideologically independent than judge
Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229,
231 (1998).
218 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 79. R
219 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
220 See id. at 424–30.
221 Resnik refers to this as a problem with “repeat adjudicators.” Id. at 429.
222 See id. at 432–33.  Similarly, Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom calls for
rulemaking responses to the trend of  “judges . . . increasingly, and, to my mind,
inexplicably, using strict time limits to shorten the trial time of the small smatter-
ing of litigants who defy all odds to get their day in court.” See generally Nora
Freeman Engstrom, The Trouble with Trial Time Limits, 106 GEO. L. J. 933, 936
(2018).
223 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 104 (“The 1980s Advisory Com- R
mittee was a group chiefly distinguishable from their predecessors in the 1970s
by reason of the greater representation of judges appointed by Republican presi-
dents, whose presumed ideological preferences made them more likely to favor
retrenchment and thus to take their lead from a Chief Justice who was not shy
about telling them what he wanted.”).
224 This is Burbank and Farhang’s claim at the federal level, for example. See
id. at 243.
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members.225  It must be true, for example, that practitioners
weigh client interest (and their own pecuniary interests)
against ideology more heavily than judges do.226  And because
state committee members have diverse client bases, these cli-
ent interests will not be monolithic either.227  State practition-
ers are also more independent of the Chief Justice of the United
States, meaning that states should be willing to reject Federal
Rule amendments such as “proportionality”228 and federal pro-
cedural decisions such as Twombly and Iqbal.229  And they
have been.230
A final issue relates to competence.  This Article’s compari-
son of federal and state rulemakers recalls Professor Burt
Neuborne’s 1977 article The Myth of Parity.231  Neuborne’s
most famous claim was that federal courts were superior to
state courts in technical competence: “Stated bluntly, in my
experience, federal trial courts tend to be better equipped to
225 See supra note 217 and accompanying text; see also Fitzpatrick, supra R
note 102, at 1731 (discussing the ideologies of lawyers and judges).  As noted R
above, I find partisan effects among judicial committee members in the states. See
supra section II.B.5.
226 Indeed, the notion that attorney rulemakers have some pecuniary motive is
the premise of the critique about practitioner homogeneity on the federal advisory
committee. See supra notes 89 & 217 (collecting sources). R
227 See supra subpart II.B. I expand on the theme of diversity below.
228 Professors Subrin and Main advocate for exactly this position. See Subrin
& Main, supra note 16, at 503. R
229 See Clopton, supra note 13, at 425–27.  Again, it is a normative question R
whether these differences are for better or for worse, but this paper suggests
reasons that the differences might be meaningful.
230 See supra subparts I.B–D.
231 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).  For more on the “parity debate,” see gener-
ally, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining A Role for the
Federal Judiciary, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 233, 233 (1988); Martin H. Redish, Judicial
Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction
and Constitutional Rights, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 329, 329 (1988). See also Michael
Heise, Preliminary Thoughts on the Virtues of Passive Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV.
73, 88 (2000); Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651, 651–53
(1989); William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599,
599–600 (1999); Michael Wells, Beyond the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal
Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 609–12
(1991).  Though Neuborne focused on constitutional adjudication, many have
applied his indictments of state courts more broadly. See, e.g., HART & WECHS-
LER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 299–303 (7th ed. 2015); RICH-
ARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 216 (2d ed. 1996); Brian
Bix, Considering the State Law Consequences of an Allegedly Improper Bankruptcy
Filing, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 336 (1993); David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action
Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1247, 1251–52 (2007); Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated
Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1774–76 (2008); Michael Ashley
Stein, The Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an
Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. REV. 669, 670–71 (1995).  At a
minimum, scholars routinely apply the “parity” lens to federal rights generally.
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analyze complex, often conflicting lines of authority and more
likely to produce competently written, persuasive opinions
than are state trial courts.”232
As applied to procedure-making, the question is not a gen-
eral federal–state comparison, but instead whether the handful
of judges and practitioners selected to serve on state advisory
committees are more or less competent than their federal coun-
terparts.  I have not seen any evidence casting doubt on the
individual competence of federal or state committee members.
However, the composition of state procedure-making insti-
tutions may have consequences for group competence.  The
federal advisory committee has been criticized as insufficiently
diverse.233  Some have gone as far as to suggest that this lack of
diversity has consequences for its output.234
This Article demonstrates that state rulemakers are more
diverse on a range of dimensions, and it is possible that this
diversity can contribute to decision-making competence.  In
addition to the well-known benefits of group decision-making
generally,235 there are reasons to value diverse group decision-
making in particular.  For one thing, the fact that state commit-
tee members come from different professional groups (and
sometimes from different demographic groups) might improve
their ability to resolve complicated questions of procedural pol-
icy.236  Unlike homogenous groups, diverse groups can aggre-
gate different perspectives and skill sets to solve complex
problems.237  Indeed, some research suggests that adding a
diverse decision-maker to a group will improve the overall qual-
232 Neuborne, supra note 231, at 1120. Neuborne attributes these effects not R
only to judge competence but also to clerk competence and caseload burdens. Id.
at 1121–24.  Caseloads and clerks are seemingly less important for rulemaking.
For example, even if judge rulemakers have “rules clerks” or involve them in their
rulemaking activities, this involvement seems less significant than the overall role
of clerks in typical adjudication.
233 See supra note 217 (collecting sources). R
234 Id.
235 For example, there is the “wisdom of crowds” claim that additional deci-
sion-makers improve the overall efficacy of statistical estimates by flattening out
random errors. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE
SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES,
SOCIETIES AND NATIONS 3–22 (2004).
236 One could think about this in the negative (avoiding systematic bias by
adding participants with different biases) or in the affirmative (improving out-
comes by aggregating perspectives).
237 See SCOTT E. PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY 9 (2010) [hereinafter PAGE,
DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY]; SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF
DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 9 (2007) [herein-
after PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE]; Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Problem Solving by Hetero-
geneous Agents, 97 J. ECON. THEORY 123, 143, 146 (2001); see also Elizabeth
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ity of decision-making even when that new decision-maker is of
lower individual competence.238  So even if Neuborne were cor-
rect that federal courts are more “competent” than state
courts,239 the result still might be that state rulemakers are
more competent as a group.
State committee diversity also might improve information.
A major challenge for rulemaking is the acquisition of accurate
information.  Indeed, the federal advisory committee has been
criticized for its lack of reliable, empirical support for some of
its decisions.240  I have no evidence that state rulemakers are
more likely to acquire the “big data” that some critics are seek-
ing.  But at a minimum, the anecdotal experiences of diverse
practitioners should be more representative than the anecdotal
experiences of a few elite corporate defense attorneys.241  And
these diverse practitioners likely have access to more diverse
professional networks from which they can gather information.
Moreover, because states often consider previous federal
amendments,242 they have the benefit of all of the information
Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 71 (2015)
(applying similar logic to multidistrict litigation).
Page has taxonomized cognitive diversity along four dimensions: (i) “Diverse
Perspectives: ways of representing situations and problems”; (ii) “Diverse Interpre-
tation: ways of categorizing or partitioning perspective”; (iii) Diverse Heuristics:
ways of generating solutions to problems”; (iv) “Diverse Predictive Models: ways of
inferring cause and effect.” PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE at 7.  Although most federal and
state committee members are lawyers and judges—and thus may be less “diverse”
on these dimensions than equally sized pools of citizens at large—state commit-
tees evince more cognitive diversity by including attorneys that work in different
settings (e.g., solo practitioners versus big firms) and judges that work at different
levels of adjudication (e.g., state high court versus small claims court).
238 See, e.g., Ilan Yaniv, The Benefit of Additional Opinions, 13 CURRENT DIREC-
TIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 75, 75 (2004) (collecting sources).
239 See Neuborne, supra note 231, at 1120–24. R
240 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A
Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 845–46 (1993) (“What the Commit-
tee’s ‘study’ involved, other than thought experiments by judges and law profes-
sors and consideration of some anecdotal experiences . . . are not clear.”
(footnotes omitted)); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 816–21 (1991)
(raising process-related concerns about the level of empirical study the federal
advisory committee should conduct before it promulgates a new rule).
241 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELEC-
TIONS 279 (2013) (noting that diverse agents may contribute specialized knowl-
edge); PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 237, at 3 (discussing the value R
of “collective knowledge” in diverse groups).  Professor Struve has specifically
highlighted the value of practitioner members (versus judges) for information
acquisition. See Struve, supra note 24, at 1137–38.  And, again, state committees R
have a dramatically larger share of practitioners. See supra subpart II.B.
242 See supra Part I; see also, e.g., Dodson, supra note 30, at 723 (describing R
states consciously adopting or rejecting federal rule amendments); Subrin &
Main, supra note 16, at 506 (same). R
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available to federal rulemakers plus any new federal experience
since the rule changes.243  When Massachusetts rejected “pro-
portionality” in 2016, its advisory committee suggested that the
state “wait and see.”244
Including potentially conflicting interests on state commit-
tees also could positively contribute to their outputs.  State
committees are less monolithic than the federal advisory com-
mittee with respect to plaintiff- and defense-side lawyers, indi-
vidual and corporate lawyers, and Republican and Democratic
judges.245  The products of their deliberations should be those
ideas that can achieve cross-cutting support246—and it would
not take a major leap to suggest that such ideas might be more
durable and perhaps better in some qualitative sense.247  Even
if these groups do not agree on first principles, like Sunstein’s
“incompletely theorized agreements,” their compromises can
promote stability while demonstrating mutual respect.248  And
even if they do not agree on final outcomes, the presence of
243 State rulemakers thus are often offering a “second opinion.” See Adrian
Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1436–42
(2011).
244 MASS. R. CIV. P. 26, Reporter’s Notes—2016.
245 See supra Part II.
246 The claim here is based on the unexceptional notion that parties make
agreements consistent with their interests.  It is possible that diverse preferences
could produce irrationality, such as vote cycling.  But I have not seen evidence
that state rules are constantly in flux.  On the other hand, it is possible that
diverse preferences lead to inaction.  Professor Bone, for example, is not optimistic
about “logrolling” in procedure-making because he believes it will lead to paraly-
sis. See Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 24, at 922.  This is an R
empirical claim that is difficult to test, but I would note that this Article demon-
strated that diverse state committees—by logrolling or otherwise—have continued
to make important procedural decisions despite seemingly conflicting interests.
See supra Part I; see also infra note 248 (discussing incompletely theorized agree- R
ments).  And even if these observations obtained, it is possible that the benefits of
diversity outweigh its costs. See, e.g., PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY, supra note
237, at 255 (making this point about diversity generally). R
247 See, e.g., PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 237, at 196–248 R
(listing ten mechanisms by which diversity contributes to robustness of complex
systems).
248 Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733, 1735–36 (1995) (“Participants in legal controversies try to produce incom-
pletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes.  They agree on the result
and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for it.  They need not agree on
fundamental principle.  They do not offer larger or more abstract explanations
than are necessary to decide the case.  When they disagree on an abstraction,
they move to a level of greater particularity.  The distinctive feature of this account
is that it emphasizes agreement on (relative) particulars rather than on (relative)
abstractions.  This is an important source of social stability and an important way
for diverse people to demonstrate mutual respect, in law especially but also in
liberal democracy as a whole.” (emphasis and footnotes omitted)).
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dissenters can improve decision-making by resisting
“groupthink.”249
Of course, committee membership is but one way to access
diverse viewpoints.250  Formally, the amendments to the fed-
eral Rules Enabling Act and other changes by the judiciary
itself resulted in federal rulemaking becoming more accessi-
ble.251  As documented above, many states fall short on this
measure.252  The public would have difficulty accessing the
meetings of more than half of state advisory committees, and in
some states proposed rules are never published for public
consideration.253
The federal committee also is likely more accessible in
practice.  In response to the proposed 2015 amendments, for
example, the federal advisory committee received more than
2,300 comments and heard from more than 120 testifying wit-
nesses.254  Even in states with formal accessibility, I doubt that
state committees receive anything close to this breadth of pub-
lic participation.255  Anecdotally, when I queried state
rulemakers about public access, committee members from
multiple states remarked that their meetings were open but
that no member of the public had ever attended.
It is not obvious to me whether procedure-making is better
served by public access or by committee-member diversity.
But, importantly, public access and diversity should not be
seen as mutually exclusive.  One could easily imagine an acces-
sible and diverse procedure-making process.256  And the fore-
going discussion suggests that such a process would have a lot
going for it.
249 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 1–13 (2003).
250 I am using “accessibility” rather than “transparency” in order to emphasize
the public’s ability to contribute to the rulemaking process, rather than whether
committee members have opportunities for private deliberations or decisions.
251 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. R
252 See supra subpart II.C; Appendix Table B.
253 See supra subpart II.C; Appendix Table B.
254 See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Docket
ID: USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002, https://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=
USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002 [https://perma.cc/Q8M2-JJHR] (last visited Sept.
11, 2018); Transcripts and Testimony, United States Courts, http://www.us
courts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/transcripts-
and-testimony [https://perma.cc/SD8Q-WK55].  This was an unusually high
level of public attention, but in general the federal process seems to receive more
public attention than the states, and the 2015 experience may be a sign of things
to come in federal rulemaking.
255 See supra subpart II.C; Appendix Table B (documenting accessibility).
256 Some states are both diverse and accessible, though I cannot speak sys-
tematically to whether the public takes advantage of its access in these states.
Such questions are left for further study.
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With that in mind, I end this Article with a call for accessi-
ble diversity in federal and state rulemaking.  For federal
rulemaking, this Article demonstrated that more diversity
among rulemakers is not only possible but in fact exists right
now in the states.257  This Article highlighted some formal
mechanisms to increase diversity,258 such as divided appoint-
ment authority, specifically allocated seats, and requirements
on gender balance.259  It also suggested that informal norms
matter too.260  More directly, this Article has identified a pool of
hundreds of potential rulemakers whose expertise could be of
value to the federal process.261
For state rulemaking, one major barrier is the lack of pub-
licly available information about state rulemaking.  I have en-
deavored personally to make much of that information more
accessible.  For example, simply documenting the formal state
rulemaking process in each state required me to access numer-
ous legal documents that were not heretofore accessible re-
257 See supra subpart II.B.
258 Burbank and Farhang offer their own prescriptions for federal rulemaking
as well. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 242–47. R
259 See supra subpart II.A.  As suggested above, Congress considered an
amendment to the Rules Enabling Act requiring that the federal committees in-
clude “a balanced cross section of bench and bar.” See, e.g., H.R. 3550, 99th
Cong. (1st Sess. 1985) (proposing this language); H.R. 4807, 100th Cong. (2d
Sess. 1988) (continuing to include this language through House adoption and
calendaring in Senate).  On October 14, 1988, by unanimous consent, Senator
Byrd amended H.R. 4807 by substituting the full text of S. 1482, which among
other things dropped the “balanced cross section” language.  134 CONG. REC.
31,067 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988).  The amended bill was adopted by the House.
134 CONG. REC. 31,861–74 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988).  Today the relevant section
says only that the “committee shall consist of members of the bench and the
professional bar, and trial and appellate judges.” See Judicial Improvements and
Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100–702 § 403 (1988) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) (2018)); see also Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dis-
pose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-
Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2076–77 n.50 (1989)
(“The Committee is now more diverse than it was, but representativeness in this
context may be illusory.”); Mullenix, supra note 240, at 832 (“Thus, what open- R
ness advocates lost in committee representativeness, they gained in participatory
process.”).  Note, though, that Representative Kastenmeier, the primary reformer
in Congress, described this change as a “technical amendment,” 134 CONG. REC.
31,873 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988), but at a minimum there is symbolic value in this
statutory change.
260 Most states do not have formal requirements, yet still have more balanced
committees. See supra Part II.
261 See supra subpart II.B.  This would be a cousin of Professor Nash’s “judi-
cial laterals.”  Jonathan Remy Nash, Judicial Laterals, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1911,
1911–14 (2017).  Though in recent years state high-court judges have served on
the federal advisory committee, that says nothing about state-court practitioners
(or state lower-court judges).
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motely.  I have cataloged those documents in this Article’s
Appendix.262
In addition, by drawing attention to the importance of state
rulemaking, I hope that this work will increase public interest
in state procedure.  Indeed, it was public interest that led to
increased accessibility in the federal process in the 1980s.263
Perhaps this project also can inspire the state rulemakers
themselves to take further steps toward accessibility.  Anecdot-
ally, since beginning this project, dozens of practitioners have
reached out to me to express their interest in knowing more
about state rulemaking.  I am happy to oblige.
IV
APPENDICES
As described in the text, this Article includes extensive
appendices, available online, related to the making of state
rules of civil procedure and related to the content on state rules
on particular topics.  To view the appendices online, please visit
the Cornell Law Review online.  Online appendices are as
follows:
262 See infra Appendix Tables A & B.  These include, for example, some of the
orders establishing and governing advisory committees. Id.
263 See supra notes 4 & 259 and accompanying text. R
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98 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1
APPENDIX TABLE E: STATE OFFERS OF JUDGMENT RULES268
State Current rule 
Fee 
Shifting 
Alabama ALA. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Alaska ALASKA R. CIV. P. P. 68 Yes 
Arizona ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Arkansas ARK. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
California CAL. C. CIV. P. § 998 No 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-202 No 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-192a Yes 
Delaware DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 68 No 
Florida FLA. STAT. § 768.79; FLA. R. CIV. P. 
1.442 
Yes 
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-68 Yes 
Hawaii HAW. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Idaho IDAHO R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Illinois n/a n/a 
Indiana IND. TR. P. R. 68 No 
Iowa IOWA CODE § 677.1 et seq. No 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2002 No 
Kentucky KY. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Louisiana LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 790 No 
Maine ME. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Maryland n/a n/a 
Massachusetts MASS. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Michigan MICH. CT. R. 2.405 Yes 
Minnesota MINN. R. CIV. P. 68.01 et seq. No 
Mississippi MISS. R. CIV. P. P. 68 No 
Missouri MO. REV. STAT. § 77.04 No 
Montana MONT. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-901 No 
Nevada NEV. R. CIV. P. 68 Yes 
268 As described in the main text, this table attempts to catalog the states’
approaches to attorney fees in offer-of-judgment rules pleading. This table reflects
original research. The “Fee Shifting” column captures whether the state provides
for attorney fee shifting when an offer of judgment is rejected and then the final
award is lower.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 99 10-JAN-19 11:51
2018] MAKING STATE CIVIL PROCEDURE 99






New Jersey N.J. R. CT. 4:58-1 et seq. Yes 
New Mexico N.M. R. CIV. P. DIST. CT. 1-068 No 
New York N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3220 et seq. No 
North Carolina N.C. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 68 No 
North Dakota N.D. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Ohio n/a n/a 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1101 No 
Oregon OR. R. CIV. P. 54 No 
Pennsylvania n/a n/a 
Rhode Island R.I. SUPER. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
South Carolina S.C.R. CIV. P. 68 No 
South Dakota S.D. R. CIV. P. § 15-6-68 
(also found at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
15-6-68)  
No 
Tennessee TENN. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Texas TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.4; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. § 42.004 
Yes 
Utah UTAH. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Vermont VT. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Virginia n/a n/a 
Washington WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 68 No 
West Virginia W. VA. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. § 807.01 No 
Wyoming WYO. R. CIV. P. 68 No 
